Academic discussions on US democracy assistance reveal an underlying tension between commitment to democratic process and interest in desired political outcomes. This paper examines the case of Yeltsin"s Russia in order to identify deficiencies of US democracy protection policy which is vulnerable to the impact of US short-and medium-term security interests. Both diplomatic and programmatic levels of US democracy protection policy are considered. As a result, an analytical model of "security-burdened" democracy protection policy is developed. This paper argues that the model of "security-burdened" democracy protection policy could be helpful in analyzing other cases of US democracy assistance efforts in the post-Soviet space, such as the cases of Saakashvili"s Georgia and Yushchenko"s Ukraine.
INTRODUCTION
The great excitement of the international democratic community sparked by the so-called color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine was followed by an equally great disappointment. Political scientists compared the pace of democratization of Central and Eastern European countries after the 1989-1990 velvet revolutions with that of some post-Soviet countries after the 2003-2004 color revolutions, and drew a conclusion which was not favorable to the latter. 5 Speaking of external impact on democratization I use two different terms. By democracy promotion policy I mean all activities implemented by public or private foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries. By democracy protection policy I mean all activities implemented by public or private foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries. These definitions are taken from Philippe C. Schmitter and In the first -theoretical -part of my paper I try to establish what foreign policy dilemmas can be faced by democracy supporters due to their security interests. I also analyze possible solutions to those dilemmas and the impact of respective solutions on democracy protection policy. The second part deals with a particular case as I study US democracy protection policy pursued in Yeltsin"s Russia. My goal is to describe how exactly the American security interests influenced (corrupted) the nature of US democracy protection policy. In the third part of my paper I develop a model which would make possible the examination of US democracy protection policy and its possible deficiencies in other post-Soviet countries.
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE
Established democracies that belong to democratic international organizations sometimes behave in a seemingly inconsistent manner. In certain cases they do not contribute to the democracy protection or even hinder such efforts. For example, Pevehouse studied the influence of regional international organizations on democratic consolidation and revealed an ambiguity of the role played by the US. According to Ikenberry, this grand strategy is based on the idea that US security and material interests could be best attained if other states -particularly the major great powers -were democracies rather than non-democracies. 11 Such insights presented by political scientists are sustained by the official rhetoric of the US its "power of the purse" and constrain the US government"s ability to pursue policies of democracy promotion and protection abroad. 13 Conflicting US foreign policy objectives that have already been mentioned above constitute another obstacle to consistent implementation of democracy assistance strategy. The longterm objective of democratization of foreign countries is often sacrificed for shortterm objectives such as promoting US economic competitiveness and advancing regional security.
14 Most of the situations, when the objective of democracy assistance conflicts with other foreign policy objectives, can be described as one of the two interrelated dilemmas. Donor countries face the first dilemma when their efforts to democratize a foreign state can eventually lead to the destabilization of that state. In this case, donor countries have to decide between more democratic and more efficient governance. 15 Speaking more specifically, Americans might be tempted to partly abandon their democracy protection goals in a fledgling democracy by means of tolerating the ever stronger executive. The US foreign policy makers might hope that a strong president would ensure the efficient implementation of government"s decisions, though he would not abuse his powers. Governance efficiency and internal stability of a particular country might appear important in attaining US security interests, such as liberalization of that state"s economy, and preventing it from escalating conflicts with its neighbors or becoming a safe haven for international terrorists. 12 The institutions and practices to keep those leaders accountable to the public will. The content of that public will, however, is less intrinsic to this approach to democracy. 16 The outcome-based approach to democracy assistance, by contrast, regards democratic processes as those that produce democratic leaders. Therefore, it treats intervention to assist particular democratic forces into office, or to inhibit the ascent of those regarded as democracy"s enemies, as legitimate. Given the findings of other researchers, process-based policy of democracy protection should be regarded as an ideal model. 18 Consequently, democracy protection policy, which is determined by short-term security interests and is orientated towards the outcome, should be viewed as deficient. The figure 1 summarizes a theoretical part of this paper by linking possible solutions of foreign building, constitutional assistance, legislative strengthening, NGO building, and media strengthening. 20 My study of the case of Yeltsin"s Russia is based on secondary sources.
CONDITIONALITY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS
It would be an unsound exaggeration to assert that diplomatic pressure exerted by external actors can determine the course of democratization in a particular country. Especially in the case of such large countries as Russia, external actors simply do not have enough leverage to make a determinant difference.
However, diplomatic pressure is not entirely useless. In fact, international legitimation or delegitimation of a particular regime often influences choices made by internal actors. For this reason, at a diplomatic level an ideal policy of democracy protection should be based on the principle of conditionality. 19 According to Freedom House, in 1991-1996 Russia (together with Ukraine) rated as the freest post- In this regard, US democracy protection policy towards Yeltsin"s Russia was far from ideal, and many political scientists who have studied US-Russian relations share this opinion. The main obstacle to the efficient application of conditionality was the belief held by then US President Bill Clinton (and most of his advisers) that "President Yeltsin is by far the best exponent of democracy and progress and hence the path to stability". 21 It was the Clinton"s unconditional support to all Yeltsin"s actions which eventually compromised US democracy protection efforts in Russia.
Now it is a matter of common knowledge that Clinton was personally committed to Yeltsin. The purpose of this paper, however, requires the mention of at least several instances when the US failed to criticize non-democratic or even unconstitutional actions of the Russian leader. Surely, the most notorious instance was that of the so-called "mini-civil war" which took place in Russia in September- Actually, there was a shadow of conditionality in Clinton"s words when he spoke right after the Yeltsin"s assault on the Parliament building. US President pointed out that Yeltsin"s actions would remain acceptable as long as he went forward with the new constitution and genuinely democratic elections both for parliament and president. 23 Soon, however, signs of conditionality faded away. Yeltsin"s rule they have experienced the true Western democracy assistance. 29 Thus a deficient US democracy protection policy lacking any conditionality has strengthened an already negative Russians" attitude to Western democracy. 24 Ibid., p. 153. 25 Ibid. 
ELECTORAL AID
Elections assistance is one of the most important types of US democracy aid, which aims at helping to carry out free and fair elections in fledgling democracies.
Similarly, the election assistance constituted a major part of US activities in The Russian CEC put pressure on IFES to stifle NDI"s discussions with party activists, and the US Embassy warned the USAID staff in Moscow to keep their distance from monitoring efforts. Unofficially, they were told that independent election monitoring might uncover fraud benefiting Yeltsin. 33 It is clearly seen from the above evidence that the US administration and the Russian government were both set against monitoring efforts. It can be assumed that the Kremlin aimed at removing any obstacles that could prevent the newly established party Our Home is Russia 34 from winning the parliamentary election, and it had a tacit approval of the US on that.
There is more evidence revealing that the US was interested not only in a democratic election process but also in "democratic" electoral outcomes. On the eve of the 1996 presidential election in Russia Clinton took sides very clearly. Speaking to his advisers, Clinton assured he realized that the US has to "stop short of giving the nominating speech for the guy", but he also added that the US must "go all the way in helping [Yeltsin] protection, the US policy should be assessed as deficient because it has hindered a so-called "double turnover" in Russia. As it was indicated by the later experience of some other post-communist countries, voters" return to reformed communist parties might serve to strengthen democratic process.
POLITICAL PARTY BUILDING
Assisting political parties that are to compete for power in a fledgling
democracy is yet another type of democracy aid. This fact refutes the argument that NDI and IRI did not work with Russian communists or liberal democrats because those parties were not interested in cooperation with Americans. Furthermore, the exception of SDI allows to assume that the type of funding (government versus private donors) may be an important factor affecting the selection of aid recipients.
By teaching Russian pro-Western parties to conduct electoral campaign, Americans expected to improve their electoral performance. For example, NDI arranged some conferences for activists of Russia"s Choice and Yabloko to explain the perils of like-minded candidates competing in one district. 44 So, the activities of US organizations operating in Russia were obviously orientated to the electoral outcome. Not surprisingly, the State Duma amended the election laws in 1999, and NDI and IRI were prohibited from working with Russian parties on campaigns.
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE
Usually, drafting a new constitution or amending an old one is one of the most urgent tasks of the political elite in countries that have just undergone a democratic breakthrough. Of course, internal factors have the biggest impact on the drafting process. The contents of the constitution tend to reflect a balance of power among the main internal political forces, while the role of external actors is very limited.
Nevertheless, constitutional assistance is regarded as an important part of US democracy aid. Constitutional assistance is believed to be tremendously appealing to US aid providers because, in theory, a single short visit by an American constitutional expert could steer a draft constitution in a particular direction and thereby profoundly affect a country"s political direction.
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In the case of Yeltsin"s Russia, the US also tried to influence the process of received by the Embassy as soon as they were available. 47 The American contribution was recognized by the Russian constitutional fathers themselves.
Namely, the original Constitutional Commission"s draft contained the acknowledgment to two US experts.
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There are some indications in academic literature that US constitutional assistance in Russia could be deficient. It is argued that at the start of market reforms in Russia some officials within the US government became defenders of the presidential system as the best institutional arrangement for carrying out painful economic reforms. 49 However, a closer examination of the process of Russian constitution writing and the US role revealed that Americans provided contradictory pieces of advice. US constitutional law scholars did not advise the creation of a strong presidency in Russia, and US economic advisers, on the contrary, advocated conferring vast powers on a president to enable him to carry out necessary reforms. 50 On the one hand Russians received advice based on sound judgment about Russian conditions, but on the other hand they were offered advice aimed at satisfying US interests. The constitution, which was approved by the 1993 referendum, corresponded to US needs because it enabled the US supported President Yeltsin to change a cabinet at will and rule by decree.
LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING
By supporting Yeltsin"s effort to establish the presidential system in Russia, It should be noted that both of those programs were sponsored by private donors. Congressman Curt Weldon complained that he never felt support from the US administration. According to him, the Clinton administration constantly sent a message that America"s policy was based on a strong President, and not an equally strong Duma. In Weldon"s opinion, the US government made a mistake when it reinforced Yeltsin"s notion that the Russian Parliament was not an institution to be taken seriously. 55 Nevertheless, from the point of view of US security interests, the Clinton administration solved the dilemma in the right way. It did not try to strengthen the Russian Parliament which was dominated by unfriendly parties, namely Zyuganov"s communists and Zhirinovsky"s nationalists.
NGO BUILDING AND MEDIA STRENGTHENING
Two other types of US democracy aid are NGO building and strengthening of independent media. In theory, the efficiency of these two programs can be also harmed by US security interests. However, no previous research on US democracy assistance in Russia has established any instances of the deficient democracy protection policy in the NGO and media sectors. 
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To be sure, US programs aimed at NGO building are also vulnerable to possible distortion. US organizations that funded NGO projects in Russia were not free agents, their attentions were divided between Russian needs and the politics of pleasing home offices. 56 There were some instances when USAID interfered in the selection of grant recipients in Russia and added bad projects because it chose Russian NGOs that were already well connected with USAID. In some other cases USAID used its "power of purse" to affect which topics should be addressed by Russian NGOs and confined the area of their activity to particular cities. 57 Although there were some preconditions for the deficient democracy protection to prevail, no direct link between US security interests and US aid to Russian NGOs could be established.
The same goes for US programs of media strengthening. Some authors have noticed that the US assistance to Russian independent media might encounter the perils of partisanship, namely to be orientated solely towards media run by the democratic opposition. 58 However, no published research contains evidence which would reveal the US exclusive focus on television channels, radio stations, magazines or newspapers pursuing pro-American editorial policy.
MODEL OF SECURITY-BURDENED DEMOCRACY PROTECTION POLICY
In 1991-1996 the US government pursued a fairly rational Russia policy which helped to achieve a number of short-and medium-term security goals. 59 In spite of this, the Clinton administration failed to achieve its original objective, namely to transform Russia into a strategic partner and a functioning market democracy. For this reason, at the end of a Clinton"s second term the US foreign policy community started to discuss on the question "Who lost Russia?" 60 Americans realized that they had made some mistakes.
As was pointed out earlier, US security interests had a negative impact on US democracy protection policy in Russia. I described this policy as deficient because it partly contributed to the "loss" of Russia. The unconditional support of the Clinton administration for Russian President Yeltsin and politically biased programs of 
CONCLUSIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper should be regarded as the first step in examining the US democracy protection policy in the post-Soviet space. A half of decade after the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, democratic achievements in these countries seem to be more modest than expected. Georgia"s and Ukraine"s bumpy road to democracy recalls the fatal democratization difficulties in Yeltsin"s Russia.
Because of this, I started my research on US democracy protection policy from the examination of the Russia of 1991-1996.
The above-conducted analysis of diplomatic relations between the White
House and the Kremlin, and US programs of democracy aid to Russia revealed that Americans often tried to strengthen the position of "democrats" in Russian domestic politics, instead of impartially supporting a democratic process. The US actions were guided by national security interests which were supposed to be best secured by pro-Western leaders in Moscow. From the point of view of security interests, American foreign policy was rational. However, it undermined the prospect of democratic consolidation in Russia. In sum, the outcome was not optimal as Russia did not become a strategic partner of the US and remained a potential source of problems.
The model of the security-burdened policy of democracy protection which is developed in this paper is not merely a theoretical creation. It has been based both 
